

Review Article

[Harré, Rom. 1991. *Physical Being. A Theory for Corporeal Psychology*. Blackwell, Oxford]

During 1971 when I made the shift from Diploma to B. Litt. status in social anthropology at Oxford, I classified Rom Harré's lectures in philosophy of science (together with Edwin Ardener's lectures and supervision) among that group of the most intellectually stimulating and satisfying of my graduate career. 'The Shift to an Anthropomorphic Model of Man' was the first of Harré's lectures I heard, delivered for a meeting of the Anthropological Society of Oxford, later published in its Journal [JASO] in 1971. *The Principles of Scientific Thinking* (Harré 1970), *The Explanation of Social Behaviour* (Harré and Secord 1972), (given as lectures before publication), *The Philosophies of Science* (Harré 1972a) and the essay, 'Powers' (Harré 1970a) were favorites among the fruits of his thinking from which I derived great profit and enjoyment. In 1975, by the time *Causal Powers* had appeared, I had completed a three-volume doctoral thesis in which the object of study was the human action sign. Human acts and actions were conceived of as action sign systems, parallel to, but not the same as, Saussurian linguistic signs and systems.

The passage of years neither dimmed my respect for Harré's work nor did it alter the fact that the "nature, powers and capacities" arguments, the adoption of an agentive point of view, Harré's exegesis of von Helmont's paradigm of action as against a Cartesian paradigm of space and motion (using the familiar image of billiard balls) and the general notion of radically different paradigmatic models of events, e.g. dramaturgical, agonistic, liturgical, diagnostic, provided me with some of the conceptual apparatus I needed to articulate what, as a choreographer, dancer and teacher I had enacted and lived for thirty years before I became a social anthropologist. These historical notes are important for reasons made completely clear at the end of the essay.

Twenty years later, during the same year my own book was published (Williams 1991), Harré's book, *Physical Being. A Theory for Corporeal Psychology* appeared. I bought the book, read the first five chapters, skimmed the rest, and discarded it. The act of getting rid of the book in 1991 was an expression of acute disappointment about what it had to say -- more accurately, about what the book *didn't* say. Somewhere,

somehow, the notion of a *moving body* in Harré's theory had got misplaced or lost. In 1993, I went back to it.

It has become commonplace to talk of different cultural and semantic constructions of the body, so much so that

The current interest in embodiment encompasses such topics as the sexual body, the medical body, the body politic, the decorated body and so forth. While this "body" is certainly a social/cultural construction, it is viewed largely as a social *object* and exactly how actions contribute to the process of such constructions and on-going practices continues to be absent from most analyses (Farnell 1992: 4, emphasis supplied).

Following Farnell, I must say that the absence of discussion of human actions in Harré's book constitutes the major criticism I have of it. Why?

...signifying acts refer to the moving body producing action-signs and constitutes a systemic conception of *the genuine agency of embodiment*. In Harré's notion of physical being reference is made to the idea of "bodily enactments", but without any clear implication of the *genuine agency* of embodiment. The significant difference resides squarely in the fact that *the action-sign is a systematic derivation of the concept of the semasiological body* (Varela 1992: 40, emphasis supplied)

The ways in which people classify body parts, bodily wholes and their functions is so different from one society and language to another, and from one age group and profession to another in the same society and language, that such matters are usually considered ungeneralizable, except within bounded, relatively homogeneous sociolinguistic contexts. Merely to mention taxonomies of the body does not seem productive. A taxonomy by itself, whether it is biological, psychological or whatever, is a mere methodological starting-place -- perhaps a transition point.

Differing taxonomies of the body profoundly influence the ways in which two people relate to situations. For example, an ordinary French-speaker, (whether of French nationality or not, but a non-dancer), is, by

and large, orientated to external objects. A dancer who is a ballet-French speaker, has an orientation to space and situation that is entirely different. Ordinary French speakers are orientated to space and situation as *observers*, by virtue of the language and its structures which tends to place them *outside* actions and situations in which they participate. The ballet-French speaker's orientation is around the central axis of gravity of his or her own body because of the strong associations between movement and terminology during the course of his or her professional training. It is therefore not only the way in which a dancer's body moves on-stage that sets him or her apart from non-dancers, a ballet-dancer's orientation to situations off-stage is dissimilar, because of their trained-in, habituated standpoint of moving *from* their bodies.

To talk *from* the body is not only to experience the body as a lived-organism, but to enact the movement of the body to thus experience it.... This enactment is in the first person standpoint of an author creating and using the semiotic of an action sign-system (Varela 1992: 59).

Several important considerations emerge: (a) there is a connection between the technical language(s) dancers habitually use, the movements they make, the concepts of 'self' they construct and their subsequent orientations to everyday life resulting in marked dissimilarities with reference to their handling of situations; (b) taxonomies of the body function in terms of how they affect specialized (as in the ballet) or everyday actions (as in greeting gestures). Ibo people use the same designators of 'fingers' and 'arm' that English-speakers do, but Ibo notions and practises of shaking hands is different from standard English usage and practise (see Ardener 1982: 4-8).

Taxonomies of the body were involved in Griaule's and Deiterlein's work among the Dogon (1954), but as part of ethnographic evidence which led to an analysis of Dogon cosmological thought and practical activities such as tilling a maize field and building a compound. Understanding of the possible relationships between taxonomies of the body and structures of action and reaction caused medical personnel in New Orleans, Louisiana, to study Vietnamese taxonomies of the body to facilitate better communication between nurses, doctors and their patients. Many more examples could be adduced, but it would be unnecessary and tedious to do so.

In contrast to the discussion of taxonomies in *Physical Being*, it is easy to understand the import of Ellen's admirable work on classification (1977), nor is Douglas's position on *taboo* (1970) puzzling. Hertz's brilliant seminal essay first written in 1909 on the pre-eminence of the right hand developed into a field of study in social anthropology known as 'dual symbolic classification' (see Needham 1973). The notion of dual symbolic classification yielded numerous excellent studies on right and left [R/L], up and down [U/D] and front and back [F/B]. The spatial dimensions of R/L, U/D, F/B and Inside/Outside [I/O], together comprise the canonical coordinate space in which all human actions take place: an axiomatic statement in semasiology.

We conceive of these spatial dimensions on two primary levels: as intransitive P[aradigmatic]-structures (Williams 1975: 84ff) that partially explain the finite character of action sign systems, and as transitive s[yntagmatic] structures (1975: 59), which include schemes of valuation, etc. of a particular group-usage "on the ground". This work, together with the work anthropologists have done on these dimensions taken in separate pairs, coincides with some extremely sophisticated work by linguists on aspects of the conceptual basis of spoken languages, e.g. Haviland (1986); McNeill and Levy (1982), McNeill (1979), Fillmore (1983), Pick and Acredolo (1983) and others.

Because of all this, when readers are told that "Hertz (1973: 5) neatly summarizes the need for a social psychology of the way body parts are gathered under the categories of right and left" (Harré, p. 83), I was bemused by the superficiality with which the discussion was carried out. Is the author talking about a group of people who are trying to occupy the "Freud-free and Skinner-free zones for social psychological analyses of cultural life" (1992: 14), as Varela aptly puts it? Could it be that social psychology is going through an erudite exercise of rediscovering the wheel?

My perplexity about the absence of human action in Harré's book only deepens when he cites with approval Sheets-Johnstone's remarks about dance improvisations as "acts of thinking in their own right" which he called an "interesting variant" of Wittgenstein's statement, 'Now I know how to go on' (p. 29). I was at the University of Wisconsin when Sheets's first book was published (1966). At the time, her philosophical treatment

of the dance was a valuable contribution to a virtually non-existent literature. Certainly, back then, Merleau-Ponty's philosophy was an important advance for human movement studies away from the generally prevailing paradigms of logical positivism, but his philosophy couldn't adequately handle dances, dancing or dancers. Knowing Sheets-Johnstone's earlier and later work as I do, I fail to see how Harré can usefully calque her remarks onto Wittgenstein's ideas and how he neglects to notice that her approach denies ontological existence to dancing, improvised or otherwise. Would Harré classify "thinking actions" as a *things* ontology, an *events* ontology (or neither, or both)?

The subsection 'Running as an Art Form' might have been different if it had been informed by David Best's chapter on 'The Aesthetic in Sport' (1978: 99-122). For example, this passage is quoted with approval:

Running is an art form. It fits the broad definition of art as making something where nothing existed before; of making something personal and special from common ingredients available to all...you're building an ability that didn't exist before you learn to run (Henderson 1985, cited in Harré 1991: 194).

Although it fragments one of Best's elegantly developed arguments, it seems important to reproduce this excerpt:

To repeat the point, then, in my opinion it is high time we buried once and for all the prolix attempts to show that sport is art. It may be of interest to point up illuminating similarities, but only confusion can accrue from the attempt to equate the two kinds of activity. In the case of an aesthetic sport such as figure-skating, the suggestion is at least initially plausible because of the widespread failure to recognise the important distinction between the aesthetic and the artistic, and because figure-skating, unlike, for instance, football, can so easily become an art form. But in the case of the purposive sports, which constitute the great majority, there is not even a *prima facie* case, even though there may be many movements in such sports which are superb aesthetically (Best 1978: 121-122).

Closer readings of *Physical Being* lead me to suggest that the most appropriate of several modern theories of human movement¹ [see p. 263] for Harré's theory, the one most adequately matching what he seems to say in the sub-section "The Feeling of Doing" (pp. 106-109) is Birdwhistell's *Kinesics*. I say this because Birdwhistell's reliance on Deutch's 'posturology' and a clinical, diagnostic model of movement events (see Williams 1991: 223ff) calls to mind Harré's use of Kretchmer plus his preoccupation with the *experience* of movement rather than the actions themselves, and also because Birdwhistell assigns ultimate explanatory power to functionalist anatomical descriptive language (see Williams 1991: 183-84). To Birdwhistell, like Freud, "Ultimately...biology is the reality behind culture" (Varela 1992: 13).

Harré's position regarding this issue is now confusing -- doubly so because of the long and intimate association with his ideas I have had. I thought if human *actions* were reduced to gross physical *movements* set in a physiological or biological context, the significance of the action as part of human social life is lost (Harré and Secord 1972a: 39). The author's excessive emphasis on the body as *object* and its alleged "feelings" and "experiences" seemed to me to contradict the earlier position. The *instrumentality* of the human body, and the notions of *person* and *agency*, seem to have got lost.

In semasiology, a human body isn't seen as a biological mechanism but as a 'code transmitter' so to speak. It follows that a human being is a 'code generator' for two reasons: (i) because of the privileged place semasiologists assign to the ideas of human agency and person, the structures of plans and intentions and the instrumentality of the human body (see Williams 1975: 24 - Note 8, and cf. Mauss [1950]1979, and (ii) because of the coherent theory of human action signs and their spatial context(s) upon which semasiological theory and analyses is based. In passing, I think it relevant to say that one of the clearest statements of human agency I know of is Wittgenstein's: "I don't need to wait for my arm to go up -- I can raise it" (1958: 159e, no. 612).

In Harré's examination of "the basic structure of a skilled performance", readers are asked to think about the "distinction that reigns in both ballet and mime between the merely random and the ordered uses of the body in action" (Harré 1991: 107). While it is true that Anya Royce talks *about* the ordered uses of the body in action, her work doesn't answer the

question Harré asks. Nor does Harré himself answer the question, except to refer readers to "means-end hierarchies" and, ultimately, to Merleau-Ponty (pp. 107-109). As I proceeded through *Physical Being* I had to keep reminding myself that not all of Picasso's paintings and drawings were masterpieces: likewise, this book of Harré's, in my estimation, falls far below mastery. The task of critical evaluation became progressively more difficult, however, especially with reference to several injudicious remarks about the Catholic Mass.

The 'is' of 'This is my body' expresses, I am inclined to think, an internal relation between the incarnated Christ and the historical sequence of actual instances of consecrated bread and wine that have ever been held. I am not of course claiming that there is such an internal relation, only that for Christians that is how the sign system is constituted. The effect of this is immediately to extend the domain of signifiers (Harré 1991: 253-254).

I haven't read Powers, upon whose work Harré draws, and thus cannot assess the "explication of the internal relation within the two-step sign structure" (p. 254), but there is more to the internal relations between signifiers and signifieds in the Mass than a simple "two-step sign structure". It is grossly misleading to refer to such matters in this way. In support of this contention, I offer these alternatives (Williams 1975: 42-103).

The technical terms listed on Figure 1 under the heading 'further transformations', bear the following meanings: 1. *sacramentum tantum* is, literally, 'the sacrament only', i.e. just the sign; the *signans*; the sensible elements, the signifiers only. 2. *Res et sacramentum* means the sign plus the reality (the 'signifieds', in Saussurian terms). 3. *Res tantum* is the ultimate reality which combined, numbers 1 and 2 signify.

Clearly, bread and wine are already human, socio-cultural transformations from natural raw materials on an ordinary everyday level in many human civilizations. Bread and wine have, (and do), represent staple foods for many (though not all) peoples throughout the world, ancient or modern. At this level, the presence of bread and wine signifies an ordinary meal.





Figure 1


The elements 'bread' and 'wine' also represent contrasts between solid and liquid foods. Taken simply as signs of a meal, bread and wine are regarded by priests as *sacramentum tantum* -- the *signans*. The *signatum* to which the sensible signs refer is *res et sacramentum*, an intermediate term in the liturgical scale of semantic transformations which is 'the body and blood of Christ'. Thus, the following is the case:



In the *Missa Major*, the solid (bread) is associated with the body, and fluid (wine) is associated with the blood of Christ. The violence of the death, i.e. the 'breaking' of the physical body of Jesus and the 'pouring out' of the blood of the man are remembered with the semantic acts of breaking the bread and pouring out of the wine and water.

The Mass owes its essential movement structure to four acts of Jesus, i.e. 'taking', 'blessing', 'breaking' (and pouring) and 'distributing' (or giving).

Words in conventional spoken language have primacy in everything which occurs in the Mass up to the Offertory. Following the beginning of the Offertory, the 'taking' of the elements, *the acts have primacy*.



KEY

⊃ unspecified direction or place

⊕ something

◇ in the shape of

These actions in liturgical body language have the combined referential value of bringing about the unity of the ecclesial body of Christ in his grace, which is the ultimate reality which the sacrament of the Mass is meant to bring about, i.e. *res tantum*.

The first two terms, *sacramentum tantum* and *res et sacramentum* mapped onto the actions of the ministers combine to produce *res tantum*, i.e. the whole church, or in more modern terms, the mystical body of Christ. *The rite of the Mass as a totality* is a signifier for the signified *res tantum*.

The names for the central symbols of the Mass, i.e. bread and wine, are nouns. The names for the central symbolic actions of the rite are present participles and they also partake of the nature of gerunds. Often, the priest speaks of Jesus during the Mass in the third person, *simultaneously* performing gestures *in persona Christi* in the first person, e.g. a priest will

say (addressing God), "Jesus *took* bread" and at the same time, he himself *takes* bread, there and then.

The idea of transubstantiation comes from an Aristotelian way of thinking about the natural world.² Relative to this world, one could ask various questions about objects in the world, like 'what is it?', 'where is it?', 'how big is it?' and so on. The answer to the question 'what is it?' would be the answer of *substance*. The answer to any other questions are '*accidents*'. *Within this framework*, when priests are asked *what* the Eucharistic elements are, they answer "the body and blood of Christ". Any other answer to any other question is given in terms of bread and wine.³

As one Dominican put it, "it is a way of keeping the logos out of the mythos". "Keeping the logos out of the mythos" meant steering clear of a kind of materialism evident in Catholic thinking following the Council of Trent and during the High Middle Ages regarding the Mass. The sense of "this is my body" at that time came to be understood wholly in the sense of a *material* body and the word 'this' in the phrase disappeared from peoples' thinking regarding the Eucharist.

When the Mass is seen to pertain to an inner transformation of the *person* as it has for a significant number of Catholics for well over a couple of hundred years, then the word 'this' in the consecrations assumes its appropriate place. The Mass becomes a mystery to be entered into and contemplated as a phenomenon belonging to a metaphysics of self in Catholicism, not an expression of irrational dogma ignorantly to be believed. What the whole exercise represents is a way of insisting on the sacramentality -- on the *ritual* nature of what is being said. It is a way of defining the boundaries of the verbal, semantic space of the Mass. The definition of boundaries of meaning is essential to understanding ritual, Christian or otherwise.

As for attempts to *locate* the body of Christ -- that is, the 'body' in a material sense -- such attempts are simply silly. One might as well try to locate the material body of an isomer, a hadron, or the 'real' line where the equator is supposed to be. The Eucharist connotes a priest doing things with bread and wine. It is looked upon by friars-preachers as a holy meal in memory of the Lord. The word, 'Eucharist' is itself a technical theological term.

In the consecration of the chalice (in Latin, *praeclarum Calicem*), the words mean 'the good, upstanding, noble chalice'. The word, *praeclarum*, comes from the 23rd psalm, traditionally regarded as a Christian mysteries psalm, for it refers to God preparing a table for the psalmist. The table is associated with the communion table of any Mass. There is also reference in the 23rd psalm to God anointing the head of the psalmist, which is taken in relation to the anointing with chrism at Confirmation -- and there is more.

Suffice to say here that this way of talking about the chalice identifies the chalice on the altar in any given Mass with the chalice of the 23rd psalm. And it is also "*et hunc*". That is to say, the priest takes not *a* chalice or *the* chalice, but *this* chalice on the corporal in front of him, thus the chalice on the altar where the prayer is being prayed is identified not only with the table in the 23rd psalm, but with the 4th cup of the Last Supper, which was a passover meal.

To illustrate: I was once asked what happened to a bottle of wine and a loaf of bread seen by my questioner to be eaten by two old ladies sitting at the back of the nave of an Italian cathedral while a Mass was taking place in the sanctuary. "Did their bread and wine get consecrated too?" Their meal was *not* consecrated (a) because of the priest's intentions and (b) because their bread and wine was not on the corporal in front of him, therefore they were not included in *this* bread and *this* wine.

Historically, only the passover meal had four ritual cups of wine. These were drunk in a reclining position which symbolized freedom, but then, the paschal meal (derived from 'pasach' meaning 'passover') referred to a ceremony commemorating a relevant Jewish event, for the Exodus also meant freedom. A passover meal begins with hors-d'oeuvres and the telling of a story. *The ritual aspect of the meal begins with a story.* The breaking of the bread follows the story and the 4th cup of wine (the last cup) was lifted up in blessing of the whole company. The direction 'up' is a semantic marker in the Mass because one of the major meanings of the rite is contained in the actions of lifting the consecrated host and chalice *up*. The 'signified' in these cases is the offering of *themselves* on the part of the congregation participating in the Mass, hence the priest's invitation to "lift up your hearts". In fact there is a way of talking about the whole central prayer of the Mass as a "lifting up", i.e. *anaphora*.

Harré's reduction of "communion or mass [involving] the ceremony of the Eucharist" (p. 253) is by now sufficiently drowned in an avalanche of ethnographic fact from accounts of the Mass by practising friars-preachers and an analysis of a written movement text of the ritual in its entirety. But, in the critical analysis of this section, there is a crucial implicit point which turns around the absence in Harré's book of notions of *spatial* contexts and metaphors (see Lakoff and Johnson 1980), plus the omission of a stated relationship between being human and spoken language.⁴

Called upon to single out a key insight from adopting a semasiological point of view, I would say it lies in a summation of perceptions to be derived through reading Hampshire (1959), i.e. *there is an irrevocable connection between human spatial points of reference and points of application for linguistic predicates* (Williams 1991: 339). Although the statement pertains to known usages of referential gestures in everyday life regarding pronominals (I, you, we, etc.), adverbials (e.g. here, there), affirmations and negations, and prepositionals (over, under, beside, into, etc.) and the like, semasiology carries the notion even further with regard to the spatialization of the *indexicalities* of a body language.


The interconnections between spatial points of reference and points of application of linguistic predicates remove human actions from the behaviourists' domain of the "non-verbal" where they have languished for too many years. To deal with the body as if it were a static, material entity alone compounds the mistake, no matter how much interesting anthropological or psychological *exotica* is adduced. To conceive the body as the last stronghold of a kind of cultic searching out of some 'experience' alleged to be beyond or behind appearances is a fatal mistake -- a mistake marking attempts to put all the strands of phenomenology, marxism, Wittgensteinian philosophy or whatever into some kind of new synthesis.

Harré's *Theory of Corporeal Psychology* overlooks certain fundamental relationships between spoken languages, human bodies and the actions they perform. Semasiologists know that spoken languages cannot usefully be treated, except at phonological levels, as if they were the same.⁵ Spoken languages are known to require *translation* across cultures. The human use of space and gesture also requires translation. We only deceive ourselves by assuming there are semantic, as well as

structural, universals connected with bodily use (see Chapman, 1982, for apposite argument).

All human actions take place within six dimensions of space and at least one of time. The greatly simplified structural diagram below infers a tesseract; a four-dimensional hypercube. These structures provide an abstract orientation and displacement scheme based on three fixed [A,B,C,D,E,F] and three moving {a,b,c,d,e,f} axes, which allows for the contextual "form space" (of a dance), "liturgical space" (of a ritual), "communicative space" (of a sign language) and so forth.

These structures point to a notion of a 'signifying body': that is, a *human* body belonging to a creature who generates significations and symbolic actions. It refers to a creature who possesses the nature, powers and capacities to speak, to construct and to use meaningful systems of actions for the purposes of expression and communication with others. In our theoretical framework, the signifying body is called "the semasiological body".



In western medicine, by and large, the body is considered separate from the mind and it is seen as a kind of machine; a network of purely physical processes, having functions, true, but basically mind-less

functions. The "behaviour" of this body *in that context* is believed to be best understood by comprehending the nature of its individual physical parts. Classical physics and mechanics tend to see the body in the same way, and the notion of a 'real' body without a mind is a product of classical deterministic physics.

Semasiologically, the signifying body is seen to exist in a kind of field consisting of a timeless state of no energy, *as a super-position of possibility in a mathematical framework of all theoretically possible moves* that it could make, with equal probabilities of realization, until an actual 'move' or 'act' takes place. At that moment a choice (not necessarily conscious) has been made in a field of complementarities, or 'processes' which manifest themselves as empirically visible acts. Although the body has equal *probabilities* of realizing actions out of a theoretical field of *possibilities*, not all possible actions are realized. A determining factor here is the hierarchical system of values which a particular culture places on spatial dimensions, gesture, etc.

Semasiological theory also provides for literate, textual renderings of socio-linguistically constructed human bodies performing actions in any context including 'everyday life'. Using several levels of subsequent analysis and explanation, the descriptive ethnographies that result from such analysis and explanation are firmly grounded in scientific fact -- facts based on the mathematical descriptions of the human semasiological body and the space(s) in which it moves. Theories of physical being, or theories of embodiment which are less complex in terms of definition, specification and formulation are not equal to the magnitude or the potential intricacy of the tasks of description, interpretation and explanation of human actions -- or human being.

A final note: many months ago, I sent Harré a copy of this review. He replied by informing me I had completely misunderstood *Physical Being*. His response provoked me to express deep concern to Charles Varela about the absence of the moving body in Harré's theory. I recognized not only the impossibility of being able to devote the necessary time to an examination of his more recent work in order to discover the problem -- a formidable scholarly undertaking -- but also that a theory as complex (and basically sound), as Harré's deserves to be treated with care.

I believe that Varela has elegantly and successfully identified the problem -- and it *is* a problem for these reasons: 1. semasiology is dependent upon early Harréan concepts in many ways; 2. I'm not willing to be "out-historicized", as Ardener used to put it, because my work in human movement studies has been overlooked in favour of Sheets-Johnstone and Royce, and 3. former graduate students' work based on semasiology shouldn't be minimized or misunderstood because of all-too-fallible human memories and the many vicissitudes of publishing these days.

Drid Williams

NOTES:

¹ See Williams 1991: 208-243, for an exegesis of these theories.

² And, there are innumerable Catholic jokes regarding the superstitions surrounding transubstantiation, e.g. those about mothers who won't let their children have ice cream after they have had communion, ". . . so you won't get the baby Jesus's feet cold", etc. The Eucharist has nothing to do with the physical or chemical properties of bodies. The body of Christ not only doesn't 'come' or 'go' anywhere, there is no evidence of chemical change in the host, or the contents of the chalice following the consecrations. Thomas Aquinas was quite clear about this: the only analogy he uses is that of creation, i.e. *creation out of nothing* .

³ It is not, by the way, binding on Catholics to hold to this as a philosophical framework, as is sometimes thought by some Catholics and non-Catholics alike.

⁴ The author might argue he had no intention of talking about space and/or actions and conventional language in this book. If so, then a serious omission is evident because the parameters of the work weren't adequately defined, given the amount of literature that has been generated in the past two decades.

⁵ Semasiology provides for a corresponding level of study which we call 'kinology' but we don't privilege this kind of analysis, believing, for example, that kinology is where the 'reality' lies.

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