POCOCK, WILLIAMS, GOULDNER: INITIAL REACTIONS OF THREE SOCIAL SCIENTISTS TO THE PROBLEM OF OBJECTIVITY

1. Introduction

Between 1958 and 1962, with the publication of Polanyi's *Personal Knowledge* and Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, objectivity comes to be recognized as a problem of fundamental, not to say ultimate, importance. The problem is of ultimate importance for the pursuit of all forms of knowledge. It is, of course, of fundamental importance to the natural and social sciences. Polanyi and Kuhn are two of the natural scientists who, by the mid-twentieth century, have defined the problem in such a way that their work is recognized as revolutionary. The revolutionary meaning of their work in fact defines the context in which objectivity derives its fundamental or ultimate importance.

It has been understood for some time now that Polanyi and Kuhn represented the revolt against positivism as a conception of the way science is and should be practised. Within the framework of the positivist conception was a special view of the nature of scientific objectivity. This special view is essentially this: to attain knowledge and to be certain that the attainment *is* knowledge, one is to confine oneself to the methodological conduct of mind prescribed by science for scientists. Implicit in scientific method is the discipline of self-control. The scientist is obliged to see to it that value, feeling, imagination; in short, all non-rational factors are so controlled for that their influence over rational processes is at least minimized. Ideally, they are to be eliminated. Historically, the sociological import of the obligation to control for non-rationality was clear enough: religion, art, politics, everyday life itself in general, was to be strictly separated from science. Social institutions and the conduct of life, then, were taken to be the scene of the practical necessity of the non-rational that cannot be rational in the same sense as science -- permeated with the ever real threat of the irrational. Society and life are not rational and cannot be. They are ultimately, inevitably dangerously irrational. Beyond science the world is impure and dominated by prejudice and discrimination. The new sanctuary for the retreat to purity; the sacred space within which new rituals are to be formed as the mystical occasions for knowledge -- the new magic -- is, of course, modern science. Insofar as the social sciences participate and believe in the 'religion' of modern science, they too become (magically) both 'scientific' and 'modern'.

The problem of objectivity, then, is the problem of the positivist view of objectivity. That view is now rejected as inadequate and a new view of objectivity is required. Polanyi and Kuhn rejected what has now come to be called objectivism; the positivist notion that objectivity stems from a bias-free or value-free mind.

Objectivism (in its insistence that being objective meant being value-free) was, therefore, insisting that knowledge was impersonal. Polanyi and Kuhn can be understood to be in essential agreement that objectivity is not value-free and knowledge is not impersonal. Polanyi, of course, specifically demanded that this mean that knowledge is personal: 'knowing' is a decision -- not simply a conclusion -- and decision is a value-permeated rational judgment whose universality one is both committed to and responsible for. The decision is made by and for a knower. Therefore, the person becomes a necessary part of any understanding of knowledge (1974:49-81). Kuhn as well understood that knowing is a decision and not a conclusion which, ideally, could be operated by a computer. But in his or her work, the person is clearly implicated, although not specifically emphasized (1977:320-339). Kuhn seems to prefer an emphasis on the communal or social nature of such decisions. The special reason seems to be that Kuhn is primarily interested in paradigms and normal science, and, furthermore, a science that is or can be in revolt against its own paradigms. The person of the scientist is absorbed but not dissolved into the institutional and social processes of normal and revolutionary practices.

Polanyi and Kuhn thus created the intellectual context within which the problem of objectivity was to be understood. The problem is one of several, defined by the revolt against the positivist conception of science. The objective act of knowing is now rejected as an act that is neutral (value-free) and impersonal. The objective act is now understood to be value-involved, personal and social. The conception that objectivity is neutral and impersonal in time comes to be referred to as 'objectivism'; what Gademer called "a prejudice against prejudice". And so both Polanyi and Kuhn are for objectivity and against objectivism. The intellectual context of the revolt against positivism thus defined the problem of objectivity as a rejection of objectivism and the pursuit of a new conception of objectivity. This context and definition is the situation within which the social sciences confront the problem of objectivity.

This paper intends to present the initial reactions of three social scientists to the problem of objectivity. Two of the three are social anthropologists, David Pocock and Drid Williams, whose reactions were initially made during the first half of the 1970's. The third is a sociologist, Alvin W. Gouldner, who made known his reactions in the early 1960's -- the year Kuhn published his classic. In this presentation, Pocock's, Williams's and Gouldner's work on the problem will be restricted for the most part to their first papers. Limitations of space and considerations of balance in this account require selection.

The examination of the reactions of these three social scientists permits an appreciation of their relationship to each other. The examination intends to show that the relations among their initial reactions to the problem of objectivity (although unknown to each other) can be taken to be a shared attempt to extend the revolt against positivism to the social sciences in the specific form of advocating objectivity in contrast to objectivism. I intend to show that Pocock is for objectivity essentially in the form that Polanyi presented it in Personal Knowledge. Pocock is against objectivism precisely because he wishes to free anthropologists from such a conception so that they may be free to be objective as personal anthropologists (1973:1-22).

With Williams, I will reveal that she acknowledges Pocock's influence, but takes a significantly different view of the problem. She is for objectivity and in fact explicitly calls for a new objectivity in view of the impossibility of objectivism. Polanyi thus begins the problem but does not end it and Williams is against objectification -- not simply objectivism. Here, Williams insightfully points to the ethnicity of objectivity and its failure -- prejudice -- using Kuhn's term 'paradigm' to refer to the world-view and assumptions that tacitly inform any cultural work that produces knowledge. Williams indicates that the paradigm shift to semantic anthropology entailed ontological and therefore, epistemological, consequences. Thus, if the human animal is uniquely human and not simply another animal precisely because humans are semantical, then human nature is cultural. Any form of knowledge is cultural and objectivity is therefore rooted in some form of ethnicity. Positivism, in denying the ethnicity of objectivity, indicated its prejudiced character and consequently its vulnerability to dogma. The prejudiced character of positivism is for Williams most conspicuous in its objectification of the knowing process: knowing is impersonal, not personal and as such is subject to a deterministic conceptualization (1976:16-30).

In moving from Williams to Gouldner, the only sociologist of the three writers, he will be shown to present the same posture of being for objectivity and against objectivism as Pocock, but, like Williams, with a significantly different insight. Gouldner assumes the ethnicity of objectivity and intends especially to explore the pathology of objectivism. Objectivism entails for Gouldner <u>ab</u>jectification. The demand that objectivity is a value-free act also demands that the knower reject any critical impulses in exchange for the autonomy to practise knowing. Gouldner implies that this necessary feature of objectivism is pathological and that it assumes a variety of specific forms which I will call the casualties of neutrality (1973:3-26; 1976:xi-xvi).

All three social scientists are for objectivity and against objectivism. Williams and Gouldner specifically explore importantly different emphases; 'objectification' and 'abjectification' respectively. It can also be seen that in addition to their different emphasis each scholar represents a different role or function in his dealings with the problem of objectivity. It will be seen that Pocock appears to be an example of the personal anthropologist he is calling for: he daringly uses himself as a case study illuminating the fruitfulness of Polanyi's conception. On the other hand, Williams presents a unique dimension to the responsible move of using oneself as a case study. In her exercise in applied personal anthropology, Williams reveals a transformation of self: her personal, but not 'subjective' analysis, identifies her shift from an amateur to a professional anthropologist. In that demonstration, Williams is more than an example. She is an exemplar.

Gouldner's role is neither that of an example nor an exemplar of the personal sociologist. The point is not that Gouldner cannot be so understood, because he can. Rather, the point will be to show that Gouldner's special role and function is to illuminate the factor of criticism implicit in Polanyi's conception of personal knowledge (1974: 34-48). To recover the necessary features of (i) value-judgment,

(ii) the person, and (iii) commitment in a new conception of objectivity is a recovery that is in Gouldner's view seriously incomplete. He reveals that the recovery of the knower in the knowing process is the recovery of the knower as a critic. This feature does not complete the task of a new conception of objectivity but brings us to the threshold of profound discoveries yet to be made of our human and cultural nature as knowers. The profoundness of such discoveries is suggested by Gouldner's provocative insight that objectivism demanded the rejection of the critical impulses of the knower in exchange for professional autonomy (1970:20-60). Pandora is now a willing mistress and no longer a sphinx who may indeed have been what Wilde once imagined; one without even one secret. We will begin with Pocock and examine the form and content of his paper on the idea of a personal anthropology.

2. Pocock

The form of Pocock's paper can be indicated by three functions he serves in writing it. First, that of initiator: as of 1973, he was the first to introduce the idea of personal anthropology to British anthropology. More than that, he then applied the idea, not only to the work of others, but to his own work in anthropology. He is not only the initiator and applicator of the Polanyian idea, in his self-application he became an exemplification of that very idea. He makes it clear that in initiating, applying and exemplifying, he seeks only a presentation and not an exegesis of Polanyi's conception of personal knowledge. Consequently, Polanyi's work is a stimulus of encouragement and not a stimulus for discovery. The predominant theme expressive of the encouragement to present Polanyi's idea to anthropologists is the stance of being for objectivity and against objectivism. In the former, the idea of personal knowledge is the occasion for the reformation of anthropology -- from the impersonal and individualistic pursuit of knowledge to the personal and social achievement of knowledge. In the latter, the idea of the meaning of objectivism is the occasion for the liberation of anthropology: in lifting the denial of personal knowledge, the anthropologist is freed both to approximate greater truth in communication and is freed to approximate greater relevance in theoretical formulations. Thus, to speak from the truth of one's personal membership in a culture is indeed to be liberated. And such liberation, Pocock believes, is the proper approach to a new humanism in anthropology.

That Pocock is not giving us an exegesis of Polanyi's idea of personal knowledge is clear from the body of his paper. In presenting himself as an example of personal anthropology, Polanyi's idea is embedded in the application. Reconstructing the presentation, we can identify the content of that idea as Pocock understands it. The theme that emerges from the reconstruction of the content of Polanyi's idea in Pocock's paper essentially consists of the following: the watershed (or breakthrough) beyond positivism is the abandonment of its concept of objectivity which is itself generated by a dehumanized conception of human being. The discovery of a new conception of objectivity is itself generated by a humanized conception of human being (Harré, 1971).

Thus, the ideal of objectivity in the positivist tradition is mathematical and its two main components are purity and formality.[1]

These components betray, on the one hand, the demand for immaculate perception at the expense of the person, and on the other, the demand for immaculate conception at the expense of the social. Thus, the suggestion is that the individual in the act of knowing, is a "Ghost in the Machine", the machinery of mind perceiving and of mind conceiving. The nature of the subject knowing the object is in theory dictated by the mathematical ideal, thus being objective is the being of an object -- the denial of human being and the submission to the machinery of knowing. The demands for the dual immaculateness of mind are variations on the central demand at the heart of the positivistic mathematical ideal; that of the certainty of knowledge or the absolute nature of truth. The object of knowledge is defined by a western desire for 'reality' which is the certainty of truth behind the appearance which is the uncertainty of opinion. As Grene has systematically and profoundly shown in her Knower and the Known, the positivist conception of objectivity originates not with the Vienna Circle, Auguste Comte, or René Descartes. Inspired by Polanyi and going beyond Kolakowski's excellent study of positivism, where it is traced to the scientific revolution (1972), Grene shows the positivist vision to originate in the roots of western pre-modern philosophy. That vision entails the demand for knowledge at the expense of the knower (1966:chapter 1).

In the abandonment of the positivist conception of objectivity with its mathematical ideal, the discovery of a post-positivist conception of objectivity reveals, in Pocock's view, a new ideal for objectivity that is semantical. The semantic ideal involves the components of impurity and formulationality. The demands are quite different from those for an immaculate mind. Quite simply, the demand is for the individual knower to be human in the achievement of knowledge. Pocock indicates that this does not mean that the achievement of knowledge is a psychological matter and so subjective: the psyche or personality may be relevant to knowledge, but it is not decisive. What the demand does mean is that the achievement of knowledge is a sociological matter and so is personal, i.e. the person is more than relevant to knowledge, he or she is decisive.

The personal achievement of knowledge is a decision-making process that cannot be mechanized and so is, in principle, impure: rule and value are required. The decision-making process entails a series of choices in the formulation of concepts, hypotheses, facts, inquiries, and such. Formulational choices require a commitment of responsibility for such choices. The semantical ideal of the new objectivity then conceives the pursuit of knowledge as a personal achievement through the enactment of the social role of 'knower'. Being objective is then the being of a genuine subject: the affirmation of human be-ing and the commitment to the culture of knowing.

Between 1958 and 1962, Polanyi and Kuhn gave us two books whose contents promote the successful revolt against positivism. Although there are many other contributions to the revolt before and after these two authors, they are fundamental. Pocock obviously knows this for Polanyi but just as obviously in his 1973 paper, he does not know this for Kuhn. Yet, he could have enriched his contribution with the work of Kuhn. This is certainly apparent in one of Pocock's most significant emphases; the responsibility of the social scientist to be reflexive[2] with reference to the commitment from which he or she conducts the achievement of knowledge.

The commitment to a world view and a variety of assumptions represents for Pocock the tacit and necessary grounds from which the figure of epistemological interest is to be known. Kuhn's conception of paradigm is precisely relevant at this critical point in Pocock's presentation. It is the case that Pocock persistently points out that without reflexivity, or the reflection on the tacit ground of a social scientist's work, there simply is no disciplined control for the distortion of the figure of interest. While Pocock is not explicit on the point of limiting paradigms, there is the implication that, ultimately, more than distortion is uncontrolled for. One's tacit commitment is a systematic limitation on what one can come to know no matter how much control for distortion is accomplished. Pocock is indeed for objectivity, precisely because he desires the liberation of the anthropologist from the objectivist view of knowing which significantly fails as a control for the failure to know due to distortion and, by implication, as a control for the failure to know due to limitation.

3. Williams

There can be no doubt that Williams's paper was not only stimulated, but inspired by Pocock's paper on personal anthropology. The special indicator of this is to be seen in the nature of Williams's application of the idea of personal anthropology. Her application documents the personal transformation of an amateur anthropologist into a professional anthropologist. Recently this exercise has been developed by Williams in a new paper, 'Philosophical Anthropology and Its Relation to Semasiology' (1984). In both papers, Williams is more than an example, she is an exemplar in the application of the idea of a personal anthropology. In systematically analyzing her change in status from amateur to professional, she explicitly uses the idea of paradigm not only to identify the tacit commitment to a meta-theory informing one's work, she uses Kuhn's idea to differentiate between the structural features of distortion and limitation; the two aspects of failed objectivity.

Her use of the paradigm feature of limitation is fundamental because it signifies the declarative attitude of the paper. As an exemplar of personal anthropology, she is declaring a paradigm shift to a semantic approach to anthropology. This shift allows one to transcend the limitation of the positivist paradigm and to see people as human beings who happen (in one aspect of their nature) to be animals: meaning-making, rule-following, language-centered creatures. The transcendence of this limitation to seeing human beings and not only human 'be-havers' then allows Williams to introduce her distinctive contributions to anthropology, i.e. semasiology: human movement as a genuine semantic.

What has been delineated thus far are two of the three dimensions defining the form of Williams's paper: declaration at the heart of exemplarization. She clearly understood that the transcendence of the limitation of the positivist paradigm required a new ontological assumption; the assumption of the person as a cultural being. However, she also saw that the new ontology entailed an epistemological implication. If the nature of the human being is cultural and the living of culture is the fact of agents making meaning in their multi-lingual encounters, then a new conception of objectivity is implicated in that fundamental social fact.

While not providing that implied concept, Williams is not merely calling for it. Through her discussion she is sensitizing us to a new conception of objectivity, and within the structure of her sensitizing conception, she permits a point of departure that intimately links her work with Gouldner's. In Williams's reminder that cultural ethnocentrism is the social root of prejudice and so a structural feature of the logic of ethnicity, we have the occasion for a further reminder. Ethnicity, ethnocentrism, and prejudice are of course fundamental for any form of cultural community, science itself having been the most recent discovery of that social fact. Gouldner starts his venture into a critique of objectivism by translating the problem of objectivity from a logical to a culturalogical level. He then conducts a sociological analysis of the ethnicity of objectivism. We will now complete Williams's contribution by attending to her sensitizing concept for a new objectivity.

It is analytically clear that Williams accepts the semantic model of objectivity that Pocock substitutes for the mathematical one inherited from positivism. However, it would seem that for two good reasons, Williams gives us a broader model -- that which can be usefully thought of as anthropomorphic. The first reason: she sensitizes us to the idea of the ethnicity of objectivity. That is, any attempt to know, whether scientific, religious, philosophic or whatever, is an attempt of some member of a cultural community who is the 'origin', so to speak, and the generation of such attempts. Any science is human, communal, and lingual; therein lies the ethnicity of science. Any ethnic form of life has the universal and necessary features of ethnocentrism and prejudice, and we may now add objectivity. It is perhaps western culture that makes the feature of objectivity explicit, converts it into a problem and is subsequently involved in a series of solutions.

When Williams documents her transformation from amateur to professional anthropologist, she is following the norm of western civilized culture. Her awareness of the need for a new conception of objectivity implies her recognition of the context of the problem. The shift from amateur to professional is thus a shift from membership in the common culture and its common methods of sense-making to a specialized sub-culture and its rather more uncommon and rigorous methods of sense-making. The hope and belief is that the commitment to the new ethnicity -- a social framework designed for the achievement of knowledge and the control of prejudice -- is an advance over the ethnicity of the common culture. The burden of the solution to the problem of objectivity resides here: the conviction that the sub-culture is an advance over the common culture, because knowledge is achieved and prejudice is controlled as never before. That Williams sees our need for a solution indicates her perception of the failure of positivism and the need to justify anew the sub-culture of social science. It is in this sense of the ethnicity of objectivity to which Williams sensitizes us in order that we can assert her model of objectivity which is anthropomorphic.

The second reason for the assertion is Williams's notion of the objective act as reflexive; a self-conscious and transcending act. Accepting Polanyi's insights into the objective process as one in which a self shifts from subjective to personal, Williams specifies that process. The shift from subject to person is one in which transcendence and not only universalization is intended. The intent of personal knowing is knowing the universal: that intent is a claim that is a conception, a belief, and a responsibility. But, Williams wishes to add that the intent, claim and achievement of knowledge of the universal is also an act by which one transcends both the self as subject and the common culture to which that subject is committed. Here, it would seem that Williams is articulating (and in so doing is trying to get at) what can be called the universal moment of being cultural. It is as if the social scientist at such moments is in touch with the competence for cultural being while enacting a virtual performance, not an actual one. In Williams's recent paper on philosophical anthropology where she begins to investigate the regions of her personal paradigm, especially religious transcencence is given further treatment. As yet, this reader is unable to determine whether such further treatment is primarily subjective, or if it is personal. Therefore, critical comment will be witheld for now.

The new concept of objectivity that Williams sensitizes us to is one based on an anthropomorphic model and objectivity is an ethnic affair the attainment of which is a personal achievement of universalization. The intent of knowing is knowledge of what is universal in the cultural being of human kind. To intend such knowledge of the universal is to be universal and so to be cultural at some knowing moment. To be in that universal moment is to transcend both one's culture and one's subjective commitment to it. In so doing, knowing is not the objectification of a cultural member: the reductive process by which membership is shifted from person to subject, and so from subject to object. Rather, knowing is the constructive process of carefully describing the complexity of both subject and person living a membership in some communal form of life.

4. A Summary <u>en passant</u>

Thus far, I have presented the view that all three social scientists are for objectivity and against objectivism. The significant differences among them are denoted by their varying emphases. Pocock focused on objectivity and utilized Polanyi to liberate anthropologists so that a more sophisticated objectivity could be practised. Sophisticated -- and more so -- since knowing is objective precisely because of the personal and not in spite of the personal. To be objective now demands that a social scientist not be simply reflective, theoretical, methodological and analytical. He or she is now compelled to be reflexive, meta-theoretical, introspective and evaluative as well. It is not only what one thinks, but it is also (and deeply) that one believes in what one thinks.

The issue is what one believes, because those beliefs inform what one thinks, thus, the truth in one's communication is intimately entailed by the truth of one's communication. To be truthful may not be confession, and perhaps should not be, but it is certainly an admission of those beliefs which systematically define the whole enterprise of one's knowing career. Knowing of the 'other', then, requires knowing of self.[3] This reflexive knowledge functions to control for the failure of knowing by identifying the person whose believing is central to that control. This seems to be Pocock's conception of personal anthropology as liberation; his offering of a counsel of perfection.

As we have seen, Williams has focused on objectification and therefore reminds us of the ethnicity of objectivity. Her paradigm shift to semantic anthropology entails the central insight into the failure of positivism; the failure of positivism to control for the prejudice of conceiving not only the subject as an object, but of conceiving 'knowing' as de-personalization: knowledge without a knower. In her own pioneering specialization, semasiology, Williams deepens our understanding of the cultural nature of human be-ing. It is not only when we speak to each other that we are rule-following, meaning-making and lingual. This is true when we are moving or acting to each other; equally true and not less. Having provided a theory of human movement as a language, she has provided us with a way, for instance, to more fully appreciate Langer's conception of non-discursive language.[4] In driving one of the last nails, along with Langer, into the coffin of Cartesian dualism, Williams demonstrated that the human being is cultural and fully cultural. Cartesianism required a ghost in the machinery of both 'minding' and 'bodying': a missing person and so a person missing in the actions of speaking and moving. It is the person who speaks and moves and it is the person who is therefore open to being categorized as 'mental' and 'physical'. The demonstration of our full cultural nature is simultaneously a declaration of an ontological commitment. Thus, if meaning-making is central to both speaking and moving, then knowledge claims are intrinsic to both acts and systems of human actions. Consequently, any form of human life -- cultural or sub-cultural -- is defined by the nature of these act and action systems. Science cannot be an exception. Any conception of objectivity can only make sense within the more fundamental conception of our ethnicity.

5. Gouldner

Gouldner can certainly be regarded as an example of the personal sociology he espouses, even more, perhaps, as an exemplar as well. It is not these facets of his work that I wish to emphasize, however. From 1962 until 1975, between the publications of 'Anti-Minotaur: The Myth of a Value-Free Science' and 'Toward a New Objectivity', Gouldner's work on the specific issue of objectivism and objectivity spanned almost fifteen years. During this period, he wrote a third paper on the issue: 'The Sociologist as Partisan: Sociology and the Welfare State' (1968). These led to his momumental book, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (1970).

In this book, objectivism and objectivity are fundamental but by no means exclusive concerns. Objectivity is given systematic treatment as Gouldner himself moves towards a new objectivity. Sociology is being defined by the sociologist. His pursuit of knowledge of the social, which is always a personal achievement, is the goal. At the heart of that personal endeavor is the subtle knowledge of reflexivity. In these papers and others, together with his book on the coming crisis, Gouldner not only established himself as an example and an exemplar, but as a leader. Several scholars have provided fine leads on the issue of objectivism, but only a few provide leadership.

In Gouldner's pursuit of an understanding of meaning-making in American sociology as occasions for claims to knowledge and objectivity, he set himself the task of reconstructing the foundations of modern sociology. In turn, this led him to the roots of sociology in western philosophy. 'Enter Plato' (1965) offered us Plato as the first social theorist. In 1976, the first volume of his trilogy, The Dialectic of Ideology, was published, followed by the second (1979), and last (1980). In the 'coming crisis', academic sociology especially was the focus of interest and his aim was demystification: the uncovery and recovery of knowledge as meaning-making. In his trilogy, Marxism is subject to the same demystifying treatment and aim, thus as he leads us from Plato to Parsons to Marx, Gouldner has been relentlessly in pursuit of the theorist behind the theory in order that he might uncover the structure, the grammar, the foundations of knowledge, objectivity and objectivism. This is how he reveals his leadership; a leadership that has carried forward not only the tradition of Weber's commitment to the understanding of western rationality, but the tradition of Marx's commitment to the transformation of western rationality. In true Gademerian fashion, Gouldner has indeed carried forth both traditions, not as a 'true' believer, but as a critical believer. The primary source of Gouldner's leadership is the Socratic tradition of the intellectual as critic and believer. One is critical because one believes, and one believes because one is critical.

Socrates, Weber and Marx suggest the special way in which Gouldner is for objectivity and against objectivism. In focusing for the most part on the 'Minotaur' paper (1962), we can see Gouldner's initial formulation of his attack on objectivism in the name of objectivity. In this paper, his formulation consists of the thesis that the value-free imperative of objectivism entails much more than the objectification of the subject as known and knower. The point here is the insight that objectification entails abjectification. Neutralization (not only neutrality) is an imperative in this view. Objectivism demands that the natural scientist or social scientist is to be neutral and free of values, and therefore, neutralized and free of any desire or impulse to be critical.

In Gouldner's context, the terms 'critical', 'critic', or 'criticize' refer not to the expected analytical function of the scientist in his or her everyday activities; that is, one who reflects on and analyzes the technical adequacy of the scientific practices of theory and research. Later, of course, Gouldner was to identify this practise as normal science in Kuhn's strict sense. With the emergence of a science, Kuhn states precisely that criticism ends. Here, we may take Kuhn's meaning to be exactly that of Gouldner. To engage in the activity of the critic not as a technician but as an intellectual is to reflect upon and to analyze the foundational adequacy of theoretical and research practices.

For the natural sciences Kuhn's conception of paradigm is his interpretation of the foundational nature of scientific practice. Gouldner (1962) had two references to the meaning of the intellectual critic as against the technical critic. His explicit reference is to Socrates. The implicit reference is to Marx. The intellectual critic is one who, in making a value-judgment, is bringing into question the foundations of any cultural practice of meaning-making -- societal, religious, philosophical or scientific. Gouldner's thesis is the claim that objectivism converts the scientist into one who renounces intellectualism in the name of technicism. To criticize the foundations of any cultural practice of meaning-making from the common-sense or ordinary forms of life to the uncommon-sense or extra-ordinary forms of life is, for the technician a taboo. Gouldner's special view of this kind of practice, especially in sociology, can be called abjectification.

In the practise of the myth of value-free science the sociologist renounced his (and her) intellectual responsibilities and therefore abjected that self before society and his or her profession. Gouldner's analysis of this renunciation reveals a variety of serious consequences flowing from it. I shall refer to these serious consequences flowing from neutralization -- the renunciation of intellectual criticism -- as the casualties of neutrality. The casualties of neutrality in Gouldner's analysis can be understood to be symptomatic of pathology and the suggestion of a problem. The casualties are symptoms of the cognitive pathology of objectivism and they suggest that science in the twentieth century is not simply a source of social problems, it is a social problem. The deeper suggestion is that Gouldner was beginning to see science as a social problem because he sees certain forms of modern rationality as profoundly problematic.

Gouldner's critique of objectivism is substantially different from Pocock's and significantly different from Williams's. Pocock's emphasis on reflexivity is still specifically geared to the knower as an agent. His concern is with failed objectivity, distortion and, perhaps, limitation. Since he does not appear to have been sensitized by Kuhn's work he systematically fails to differentiate between the scientist and science. He does not seem to distinguish between the tacit grounds of the scientist and the tacit grounds of the scientific community. Thus, we cannot tell from Pocock's paper whether reflexivity simply and exclusively illuminates personal and perhaps conflicting variations on a tacit paradigm: the usual competition among normal scientists. His presentation lends itself strongly to that reading.

In this case, accepting this reading, Pocock does not explicitly and systematically emphasize the intellectual critic as defining the very heart and soul of reflexivity. With Williams, the situation is not exactly the same: sensitized by Kuhn's work and herself a pioneer embarking on a paradigm shift to semasiology as well as an earlier critically-inspired transformation to professionalism, Williams's own performance is informed by a most serious intellectual criticality.

To be sure, her explicit emphasis on transcendence in the reflexive act of being objective is a re-statement of the Old Testament's vision of the spirit of intellectual criticality, however, in the paper under consideration, Williams simply does not articulate and therefore does not formulate, intellectual criticism as the soul of reflexivity. It is implied but not explicated.

Six years before Williams and three years before Pocock, Gouldner did so systematically. In his first paper (1962), it is done decisively. Here, his leadership begins. Crystallizing by 1970, the leadership has emerged in his last paper on objectivity (1975). In the Minotaur paper (1962), Gouldner conducted a relatively new mode of sociological analysis which in The Coming Crisis (1970), he identified as a personal responsibility for every sociologist. That mode he was to call the sociology of sociology. In his initial practise of it he was assuming Williams's idea of the ethnicity of objectivity and was especially interested in a sociological analysis of the ethnicity of objectivism. To do this, he looked at sociology as a profession, a social movement and a sub-culture. Sociology was first a social movement striving for the success of institutionalization. Once having realized that success, it began to be legitimized as a profession. It then worked out its own sub-culture as a 'knowing' profession.

Any such sub-system will have an ideology, and Gouldner chose to regard objectivism as the ideology of a professional sub-culture. Thus the vital question: what social functions did this ideology serve? He identified several; at least one was cultural and others were, strictly speaking, societal.[5] At the center of his functional analysis was the anti-minotaur, Max Weber. He was the charismatic leader who inspired sociology to adopt the myth of value-freedom. The spirit of Weber's vision has all but been lost and only the ghost of his legacy remains. Gouldner intended to identify and challenge that spirit and to identify and dispel the ghost. It is exactly here that Gouldner reveals himself to be an intellectual critically calling into question one of the most significant foundational assumptions of modern sociology, namely, the myth of value-freedom.

In an elegant and forthright manner, Gouldner accused sociologists of being committed to what they thought Weber meant by value-freedom, their collective idea of which was scarcely identical with Weber's views. He noted that their commitment was on the one hand dogmatic and on the other, it is performed ritualistically. The dogmatism and ritualism reveal, as expected, diverse interpretations and thus a basic confusion about Weber's position. His point goes yet deeper: it is not only that sociology is sociologically unsophisticated about Weber's position, Gouldner clearly implies that sociologists seemed not to have been interested in the conceptual justification for their beliefs. Although sociologists believed that the value-free doctrine was true -- and elegantly so -- the belief was not so much untrue as it was absurd. It was absurd because it was simply not practised and because, as an ideal, it was understood to be impossible. Thus he dispatched to oblivion the possibility of there being any rationality to the commitment to value-freedom. It was contradicted by experience and no one seemed actually to believe that value-freedom is possible in practice. The beliefs that inform the dogmatism and ritualism were therefore irrational.

Gouldner could be thought of himself to be irrational because of his lack of interest in the logic of the doctrine and his exclusive interest in the sociology of it, however, this view does not measure up to Gouldner's achievement. He had discovered that sociologists were irrational in the commitment to the doctrine of value-freedom. He transformed the issue of objectivity from a logical problem to a sociological problem. One must never ignore the fact that in this regard the discovery Gouldner made was one in which he was deeply implicated. While Williams discovered that she was guilty of the naiveté of being an amateur, Gouldner can be understood to have discovered that he was guilty of the naiveté of being self-deceived. This is not a subjective sign of some personality problem, but rather an objective sign of a professional problem that is personally experienced. The sociological problem thus became the social fact of the personal problem of a professional scientist. Inspired by Freud and informed by the later Wittgenstein, Gouldner reveals in his first paper the idea for a clinical sociology.

The above presentation of Gouldner's analysis of the irrationality of the sociologist's commitment to value-freedom is meant to clarify the following point: the thrust of Gouldner's evaluation thus far is that the spirit of Weber's position has been transmuted into a ghost that is confused, sterile and routinely violated. The main point of Gouldner's paper is not centered on the ghost of Weber, but on the spirit: Weber's personal vision that informed the position he variously presented. Gouldner's attack is executed by considering the text, sub-text and texture of Weber's presentation. The texture of Weber's work here is identified by noticing Gouldner's ultimate concern, namely, that the myth of value-freedom profoundly contributes to the educational creation of spiritless technicians. Weber's dark prophecy that the iron cage of modernity is creating sensualists without heart and specialists without spirit culminated, for his readers, in an unsettling and shocking display of moral revulsion, "...this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved" (Weber, 1958:182). We are shown this as the texture of Weber's position and what Gouldner then did is clear: Weber was shown to be moral, committed and critical in his very professional bones. This is the soul of the body of his work. From this textural reference point, Gouldner proceeds to illustrate how this text indicates that Weber commanded a rich, complex, conflict-ridden understanding and that he was deeply ambivalent, in fact, standing on both sides of the issue at once.

First, there was the moral revulsion expressed in the conclusion to his masterpiece which is an instance of a key rule of his work. Weber worshipped at the shrine of individual responsibility, so that the expression of values is mandatory under certain circumstances, but he knew in his time that there were grave hazards when values are expressed and that any such expression should be cautious. Values should be distinguished from facts, consequently, objectivity is not moral indifference, but at the same time, it could be split into a fact/value distinction.

The implication stands forth clearly: the claim to knowledge is a moral business and to proclaim (or profess) knowledge one must honour the difference between morality and business. This understanding of Weber's position permits Gouldner to register a major critical insight: the important social function of Weber's doctrine was to de-politicize the situation of the German university and to avoid state censorship. The purpose was not to a-moralize the conduct of the professional social scientist. For Weber, as Gouldner decisively reveals, objectivity does not entail neutralization -- to know amorality is not a requirement. Furthermore, the systemic dimension of these social functions was two-fold. The myth of value-freedom contributed to the social cohesion of the university and promoted the granting of autonomy to the social sciences as well as to the university. Gouldner is now ready to make special use of the third social function of Weber's myth; that of professional growth.

Gouldner is quite satisfied, although not content with, the fact that value-freedom has indeed contributed to the growth of the profession as a science. However, one of the latent functions of such growth he has observed to be that of 'paradoxical potentiality'. The autonomy of the discipline in fact frees professionals from moral compulsions and so provides a moral breathing space within which knowledge can be produced and an authentic morality can be matured. Thus the paradox: the myth of value-freedom is the potential for the legitimate making of value-judgments and not the legitimation of the suppression of such judgments. His most telling commentary in this regard suggests a personal epiphany: the question is not whether we know enough but whether we have the courage to say and use what we know, and, whether anyone knows more. The logic of Gouldner's analysis allows him to generate, for sociologists, one of his most deadly insights into the functionality of Weber's myth. The nature of the insight encourages me to say that in identifying a number of dysfunctions of the myth in the form of the way sociologists perform their roles, Gouldner has in effect 'fingered' the variety of the casualties of neutrality.

For those who use the myth to escape <u>into</u> the world, Gouldner mercilessly dissects our form of modern sophistry. If once a 'calling', sociology is calling no longer to those who now live off the profession -- not for it -- and make it pay. These prostitutes (if not call-girls and boys) of the profession would be recognized by Wilde as recent examples of those who value nothing in order to know the price of everything. The style changes in the case of sociologists who use the myth to escape <u>from</u> the world. Some are alienated from society feeling impotent before the awesome machinery of modernity and fearful lest any value-involvement catch them up in commercial debasement or narrow partisanship. Others are alienated from the intellectuals in this iron cage of modernity, feeling that they are thought unworthy of their respect and in fact are themselves entangled in serious self-doubts in that regard. Their alienation is transformed into the high principle of neutrality so that external imposition magically becomes self-imposed duty.

Looking at both types of escapees, Gouldner acknowledges that the modern sophists are accomplices who may not indeed feel any critical impulses: their abandonment grants no permission to such possibilities. But, for those who desert the world and do feel those impulses, the gods may not have blessed or burdened them with any talent for aggression. For those whom the gods have so touched, the aggression is turned inwards to assume the forms of university politics and professional polemics. Such polemics are often seen in the cannibalism of that which is euphemistically called 'methodological criticism'. Those without critical impulses, and those with critical impulses but unable to use them, do betray to Gouldner's dispassionate eye a latent meaning that indicates the presence of a hidden commandment: Thou shalt not commit a critical or negative value-judgment, especially against society.

This meaning is symptomatic of a conflict: on the one side the desire to criticize and the fear of reprisals. On the other side is the fear of being critical and the fear of being 'unmanly' or 'unwomanly' if un-critical. The conflict is resolved in such a way that value-freedom becomes the higher professional good that reigns over private interests. Consequently, both the timorous and the venal are safe in the sanctuary of high professional principle. Decent self-regard is undisturbed. The casualties of neutrality are magically transformed into the varieties of the casual style of sociological value-free work.

The ideology of value-freedom has a dualistic premise: there is 'fact' and there is 'value'. The belief that logic justifies the absolute distinction between fact and value thus justifies the strategy of segregation. The scientist separates fact from value in his work. It is exactly this strategy that Gouldner intends to challenge. The preceding analysis is a prêcis of his long argument for the dismissal of the strategy. The absurdity of the idea of value-freedom, the vacuous religiousity of the commitment to it and the human casualties that are generated in the performance of the myth that the enterprise of science is value-free all attest to the necessity (both intellectual and moral) of giving up the ghost and generating a new spirit. Gouldner deepens his argument for dismissal of the myth with two final insights: one is the cultural function of the myth and the other is the nature of the tacit bargain that unites the social scientist and the social system through the auspices of the myth.

In one of Gouldner's most celebrated characterizations of Weber's myth, he captured its cultural function. He saw that the myth could be understood as a protestant version of the Thomist effort, and the believers of the myth that followed after Weber would be best characterized as latter-day Averroists. The historical context here is, of course, the emergence of modernity in the social event of the scientific revolution. Religion in the pre-modern west was the authority in epistemological matters and philosophy was its representative spokesman. As modernity through science approaches (or is upon us), a conflict-filled set of tensions is crystallizing between religion and philosophy: the claims of faith and the claims of reason are at odds.

Averroe and Aquinas seem to have effected two compromise solutions; the one technical and neutral and the other practical and committed. The Averroist version stresses the two truths of reason and faith: when in conflict, faith is to rule. Clearly, the followers after Weber do so in the spirit of Averroes. For Aquinas, both truths are rooted in revelation. Weber's protestant version secularizes revelation and locates it in the charisma of the individual: conscience rules over consciousness and is inspired by the charisma of individual vision. Weber thus chose to protect both the university and the profession from the threat of the demon of charismatic passion by depositing it in the subjective force of personality. What is thus absent in Weber's solution is the link between personality and role: the person is missing in the action of role-playing.

It is because of the missing person in Weber's strategy of segregation that Gouldner is suspicious. The repression of the person in the name of the system (and therefore the denial of our capacity for the humane response) has apparently led Gouldner to specify his suspicion in a most intriguing manner. He asserts (again, it seems, from a moment of epiphany) that segregation tinges reason with sadism and thereby warps reason. We can infer from this that commitment to the system and the implied denial of the person generates a feeling of rage which becomes free-floating and ready for displacement.

Gouldner's epiphany deepens with the insight that as a result of the warping of reason, feeling is abandoned to a smug certainty of itself. For Gouldner, the warping of reason and the resulting smug certainty of feeling ultimately means bereftment: a common sense of our humanity has been dissolved. In keeping with our style of inference regarding Gouldner's import, we would suggest the following: the rage generated by the denial of the person in the name of the system is sublimated into an arrogant conviction of superiority that takes two forms. One is the superiority that comes from the possession of positive knowledge <u>of</u> others. Second is the superiority that comes from the possession of positive knowledge <u>over</u> others. The social scientist thus positively knows, and what is positively known is that others are determined by social forces but that he or she is not. In <u>The Coming Crisis</u> Gouldner can be seen to make considerable capital from such ideas. In the years between 1962 and 1970 he apparently unpacked what we have referred to as his epiphany: his visionary moment calling for the rejection of the strategy of segregation. From his call for the rejection of the strategy we can now appreciate the way in which the social scientist renounces intellectualism for technicism.

Weber's myth of value-freedom is first and foremost a cultural function that attempted to contain a crucial ontological fault-line that widens and deepens with the rise and development of modern society. The tension between practice and criticism, technicism and intellect is reaching dangerous levels of revolutionary significance very quickly. By Weber's time the social sciences recognized that theoretical speculation far outweighs the achievement of knowledge and so ideological conflicts threatened to dominate and also threatened the position and future of the profession. The strategy of segregation stipulated by the doctrine of value-freedom is Weber's solution. The solution works itself out as a tacit bargain: in exchange for the renunciation of the threat of charisma and intellectualism, the system supports the autonomy and development of the social sciences. Sober, technical and assuringly predictable, the social sciences are free to conduct their business and grow without moral compulsion.

The spirit of Weber's vision becomes a ghost and a-criticality comes to entail a-morality as well: renunciation becomes indifference and the varieties of the casualties of neutrality proliferate. For Gouldner the tacit bargain thus comes to encompass a variety of traits or dimensions: betrayal, the renunciation of intellect; servility, the assumption of technicism; alienation, the dissolution of the person. This bargain constitutes the essence of the spiritless technician which is for Gouldner the heart of the current social problem of science and the crisis of rationality in the twentieth century. By abandoning his or her critical faculties, the individual becomes a means to someone else's ends and in the process has lost his semanticity. The 1962 paper was his initial reaction to that social problem and to that crisis as he read the problem of objectivism in those terms. Objectivism thus came to entail all these issues for Gouldner.

6. Conclusion

Polanyi and Kuhn provided the context and definition within which social scientists took up the problem of objectivity. The context that was provided was the revolt against positivism and the special issue entailed by that revolt relevant to this paper was that of objectivity. We have suggested that the way the issue was defined was essentially that of being against objectivism and for objectivity. Both Polanyi and Kuhn were deeply committed to science and to rationality so that their revolt against positivism did not compromise their commitment. What it did was to signify their sensitivity to the complexities of the human act of knowing. They both discovered that science was, first and last, human -- personal, social, communal. The objectivity of science was found to be an ethnic and social anthropological affair. Their revolt against objectivism and their commitment to a new objectivity was therefore rooted in their appreciation of the ethnicity of objectivity. Their insight was that positivism failed in that appreciation, thus the problem of objectivism.

In their initial reactions, Pocock, Williams and Gouldner all deeply and poignantly reflected the impact of Polanyi especially, and Kuhn. Pocock sensitively and daringly exemplified Polanyi's idea of personal knowledge. Using himself as a case in point, he hoped to bring home to anthropologists the meaning of Polanyi's idea: the shift from a mathematical to a semantic ideal of objectivity, and the shift from impersonal to personal, not subjective, knowledge. At the heart of these changes was a new understanding of the human knower: a person knows and does so from a commitment to a tacit ground of assumptions and world view. The implication of this understanding was a new role of the knower: the discovery of the central importance of the tacit ground for objectivity and the control of prejudice meant that reflection is not enough. The knower is now required also to be reflexive, meta-theoretical, introspective and evaluative. Pocock seemed to have hoped that by informing his colleagues of this by way of personal example, they would see the liberating consequences of Polanyi's idea. Knowing who one is when one is knowing others puts one in a better position to control for distortion.

Williams, who was emphatically influenced by Kuhn, was thus sensitized by his idea of paradigm to the factor of limitation in the problem of being objective. The paradigm to which one is committed limits what one can know about the other, apart from distorting what is known about the other. Going beyond Pocock in this regard, Williams was able to be more than an example of the personal anthropologist. In evaluating her tacit commitments, she was able to effect a transformation of self from amateur to professional anthropologist. Pocock's fine introduction to the idea of a personal anthropology was restricted to normal science and the technical problems of objectivity and distortion. The identification of self in the evaluation of the tacit commitments was the new occasion for the control of distortion.

Williams's work extended evaluation to the revolutionary dimensions of knowing. Here, the transformation of self is the new occasion for the transcendence of the limitations of one's tacit paradigm. Williams's work involved this in a double sense, for she not only left amateurism for professionalism, but she also left positivism for the paradigm of humanism or anthropomorphism which informs her semasiological style of social anthropology. And, it is in the humanism of semasiology that Williams brings home the important insight of the ethnicity of human knowledge, objectivity and prejudice. Human nature is cultural in both the acts and actions that make mind and body lived forms of meaning-making. In the transcendence of amateurism and positivism through the self-evaluation of paradigm commitments, Williams is more than an example of Pocock's idea, she is an exemplar. Implicit in her exemplarization is a dimension of reflexivity that seems to have escaped Pocock, but not Gouldner.

Pocock took note of the therapeutic aspects of the new objectivity. He registered its salutary effects and certainly indicated that the person and not the personality of the scientist is the proper focus of evaluations. However, he did not even imply the critical dimensions of reflexivity, a direct inheritance, in Williams's work, from Ardener and from other language-based social anthropologists. Williams did clearly imply the personal knower as the intellectual critic of foundations and fundamentals.

Gouldner was not only the exemplar of the critic of paradigms for sociologists, he was a leader in that regard. Inspired by Freud and informed by the later Wittgenstein, he critically evaluated the sociological community and the personal performance of the sociologist to reveal the irrationality of the commitment to objectivism. That irrationality entailed several components: dogmatism, ritualism, confusion and the casualties of neutrality. At the core of the sociological role was the tacit bargain carrying the devastating revelation that objectivism committed the sociologist to a failure of nerve. In exchange for autonomy and support, the value-free knower was covertly to engage in betrayal and servility, the ultimate consequence of which was his or her own alienation. In that revelation, the social problem of science is identified and the crisis of western rationality is its suggested meaning.

I have identified and re-formulated ideas from three papers of Pocock, Williams and Gouldner because I think they are usefully seen as engaged in dialogue, however unintended the dialogue may have been on their parts. They shared the same kinds of situations, the logic of which was the problem of science, objectivity and rationality. The crucial theme that their dialogue represents, in my view, is the utter humanity of knowing and the grave significance of that ontological reality. They began to explore that significance and it is hoped that we will continue the exploration. It is one of the dialogues of our time.

Charles Varela

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NOTES

1. The mathematical ideal that Pocock undoubtedly is referring to is that ideal in which the focus of mathematical description and explanation is the object. This focus reveals the deterministic and mechanistic intentions of the mathematical ideal.

2. Although the matter of reflexivity will be discussed later in the text, and at some length, a preliminary treatment at this point may be helpful. The idea is fundamental to all of the three social scientists under consideration. Reflexivity is to be distinguished from reflection in the following way: to think about other is to be reflective, to think about one's self is to be reflexive. To think about the self, one can focus on the psychological dimension, i.e. personality -- the subjective. To think about the self, one may also focus on the sociological dimension, i.e. person -- the objective. Reflexivity in the context of the work discussed here is a sociological activity concerning itself with the tacit commitment of a person to a framework of meaning which authorizes claims to and achievements of knowledge. To be reflexive, then, is to think about one's commitment critically and responsibly: an objective interest in the relation between the person and his role of knowledge.

3. The important critical point here is that reflexivity is a feature constitutive of the knowing act and the knowledge claim. Systematic understanding of the self, the person as knower, is thus a necessary and central component in the achievement of knowledge.

4. This reference to Langer and Williams's connection to her work is specific and restrictive. It is meant only to refer to the specific problem of non-discursive language brilliantly raised by Langer along with her formulation of a beginning solution. Thus, the reference should restrict interpretation to that issue alone, and should not entail the assumption or suspicion that Williams shares Langer's metaphysical commitments. She does not.

5. It is a recognized and established analytical custom in American sociology to separately consider the domains of culture, society, personality, biology. This custom has its authority in the work of Talcott Parsons (1966).

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